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Development practice in conflicted countries is conceptualized and carried out 
upon a shaky economic theoretical foundation. These theories were built upon research 
conducted on the development of European nations. This has led to a focus in the 
development community on investment led growth models, which state that large and 
small scale government grants can be targeted to touch off latent engines of economic 
growth.   
In this thesis I contest that model drawing from counterinsurgency (COIN) 
examples in Iraq and Afghanistan, demonstrating how such investments can be a source 
of instability through increased incentives for rent seeking behavior as well as direct 
theft.  I propose a better focus would be to investigate and improve what I call 
commitment regimes: the methods whereby commitments are made and enforced in a 
society, be it through religious, tribal, regulatory or violent means. As these regimes are 
improved, reducing transactions cost and increasing stability, more investment will be 












































“Men and women and children have been murdered by extremists from Casablanca to 
London; from Jalalabad to Jakarta.  The global economy suffered an enormous blow 
during the financial crisis, crippling markets and deferring the dreams of millions on 
every continent.  Underneath these challenges to our security and prosperity lie deeper 
fears:  that ancient hatreds and religious divides are once again ascendant; that a world 
which has grown more interconnected has somehow slipped beyond our control.” 
Barak Obama, President of the United States 
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Development is a strategic issue for the security and prosperity of all nations. 
Falling transactions costs, for transportation and information, bring individuals and 
cultures closer together. Population growth has increased the number and the proximity 
of our neighbors, and the modern cornucopia of technological innovation has 
dramatically improved lives. Everywhere your gaze falls progress has improved 
processes, lowered prices and connected people. Unfortunately, these springs of 
prosperity are also ones of ruin. Lethality of conflict is one improved process. Prices of 
weaponry are falling. Radical ideas and messaging have become easily accessible. In 
addition, as the anonymity in massive populations grows, the balance of credible terror 
shifts away from government to individuals; problematically, individuals willing to take 
up the sword in pursuit of their goals. 
US President Barak Obama acknowledged the importance of development to the 
security of the United States in remarks made at the United Nations Millennium 
Development Goals Summit in September of 2010: “In our global economy, progress in 
even the poorest countries can advance the prosperity and security of people far 
beyond their borders, including my fellow Americans… So let’s put to rest the old myth 
that development is mere charity that does not serve our interests… My national 




and economic imperative.”1 
Many indigenous structures of governance throughout the world are more or 
less successfully adapting to these modern realities. External aid, while of benefit, is not 
critical to their continued stability. Still, some areas, often gripped by conflict, have no 
local consensus on institutions and organizations of governance or how to go about 
establishing such. In these cases external advice and guarantees can be a good way to 
create an environment where agreements leading to governance and growth are 
possible. However, in order for external involvement to be useful, a better 
understanding is required of the interaction of violence, anarchy, and development.   
While development is a primary tool sought to alleviate tensions and defuse 
incipient violence simmering in postconflict societies. The typically advocated, and 
adopted, “Washington Consensus” policies can become new sources of discontent in 
societies; illustrating Hirschman’s “Antagonistic Growth,”2 where growth leads to social 
conflict. Yet, these policies are based upon sound economic ideas, conceived by a broad 
array of well intentioned, brilliant scholars. So, why have these policies failed to bring 
the hoped for results? Why does investment in infrastructure not result in increased and 
sustained growth rates? Why do infusions of capital fail to deliver follow on investment 
and growth? A primary reason is that the base assumptions of most ideas in economics 
have been built primarily in, and for, stable states.   
The most abused assumption in development economics often goes unstated 
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and unanalyzed: the idea of a state which holds a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
violence. Weber conceptualized the state in the following terms: “A compulsory political 
association with continuous organization will be called a ‘state’ if and in so far as its 
administrative staff successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use 
of physical force in the enforcement of its order."3 Yet, this rarely exists in the areas 
where the most urgent development work is being undertaken. Even this definition of a 
state is rather imprecise.  Legitimacy is a slippery term, and how it is defined creates 
differences in how entities are treated. Is a state legitimized by international 
endorsement? Or does legitimacy depend on the opinions of the people within the 
state? The first criteria has not proven to be sufficient, and many developing “states” do 
not meet the second criterion. Yet the international community continues to regard the 
traditional territorial claims of these entities as sacrosanct, and in the postcolonial 
world, refuse to meet indigenous organizations based on coercion with countervailing 
force. This void is filled with societies which fail to develop. 
The mainstream development community has conceptually divorced itself from 
violence as a constructive tool. Utopian ideas have been adopted: the belief that 
cultural progress will free all people from coercion, without the use of coercion. Unifying 
the actions of the development and military communities in Iraq and Afghanistan has 
been a great challenge; but it is essential for coalition victory.  
This brings me to my contention. A focus upon investment led growth is flawed 
in weak and conflicted societies. The lack of a systemic method of third party contract 
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and property enforcement interrupts any positive reinvestment cycle. The risk of 
expropriation of future gains will continue to restrain investment until this problem is 
solved. Understanding the inherent violence in the base dynamic of commitment, 
especially in enforcing commitment, is essential to crafting effective and sustainable 
development solutions. 
Recognizing the significant role violence plays in shaping incentives, and costs, 
faced by individuals in unconstrained environments, will improve economic theory and 
planning. Violence is not only relevant in the realm of political science; economists 
cannot ignore the possibility that negotiations may end in expropriation rather than 
mutually beneficial exchanges.  
Ungoverned spaces continue to be redoubts for extremists and banditry. In an 
earlier age, solutions involved importing, or imposing, external systems of governance. 
In the post-colonial world, we attempt to assist these communities through investment 
programs in an attempt to “jump start” their economies on the road to prosperity. 
However, this strategy has limits on its efficacy. It is expensive, and in the face of poorly 
governed societies, it is failing. 
A new idea is rising; strategies are shifting to focus more on institutions and 
organizations within societies. But critically, advocates of this approach need to keep 
the capacity of man for violence in the forefront of their thoughts when managing 
development. Violence is not illogical actions of irrational, uncivil, or uncouth minds.  It 
is a calculated choice made by purposeful individuals attempting to shape an uncertain 




continue to lead to unproductive practices; especially in areas where the expected 
returns to expropriation frequently exceed expected returns to exchange.   
Contract enforcement is the primary fulcrum from which to productively 
leverage violence to exit a negative equilibrium.  Contracts are the bedrock of 
organizations and economic growth, and enforcement is a necessary piece of contracts.  
Nicholas Blomley describes how property rights are based on violence, a physical 
disbarment of nonauthorized individuals from the use of designated items or locations. 
He recognizes that “violence and law appear antithetical. Liberalism tends to locate 
violence outside law, positing state regulation as that which contains and prevents an 
anomic anarchy”4. When in fact, law itself is often enforced through violent means.5 
But, law is an institution which is particularly reliant upon legitimate state organizations 
of violence for enforcement. 
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in the present. Thus uncertainty in future relationships inherent in conflicted societies is an impediment 





HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT 
Strategic meetings in the decrepit palaces of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq brought 
home the idea of path dependency. Where we are depends critically on where we have 
been. Not just developmentally but also ideologically. Investment is the critical factor in 
all discussions focused on bringing development to Iraq. Job creation is the primary goal, 
seeking to reduce the pool of unemployed malcontents whose vitriol is often available 
to those willing to pay for their services.  
Investment is an easy to understand solution. It is an answer that most 
individuals imbibe from basic economics education. It is an answer which fits into the 
neo-classical narrative, which is often the introductory framework in economics 
instruction. If there is investment, there will be business creation, business creation 
brings jobs, and jobs are a prime factor related to unrest; particularly jobs for the 
burgeoning youth. The Middle East has the highest regional unemployment rate in the 
world6 and the International Labor Office estimates that the youth unemployment rate 
is “almost four times the adult rate.”7 Yet, even the billions spent by the US in the early 
years of the war in Iraq did not appear to bring the benefits predicted, in development 
or in pacifying unrest. Fraud, waste and abuse became a common moniker of the 
strategic scale investments made in early years of the war. 
What are the mechanisms which allow increases in investment to foster growth 
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in an economy? Rosenstein-Rodan observed that the vast majority of workers in third 
world countries were employed in pursuits that had long since passed the threshold of 
labor effectiveness. Agriculture was the culprit in his time. One more worker added or 
subtracted did not significantly impact the amount produced. If this underutilized 
workforce could be harnessed, through increases in investment, they would be a 
dynamo of growth, which could only result in higher standards of living for everyone.  
Walt Rostow proposed that growth followed a staged path. Starting from 
traditional society then progressing to preconditions for take-off, take-off, drive to 
maturity and, finally, arriving, along with the West, in the age of mass consumption. This 
theory is based on the idea that as a sector develops the biggest gains to be made are 
early in the process of modernization. Once this tipping point is reached there is rapid 
change, and growth, in that sector. Each sector has an optimal growth path, which in 
less developed nations deviated due to factors such as misallocation of investment, 
poorly constructed private investment, government policies or war. “In essence, it is the 
fact that sectors tend to have a rapid growth phase, early in their life, that makes it 
possible and useful to regard economic history as a sequence of stages rather than 
merely as a continuum, within which nature never makes a jump.”8 A push of 
investment then could propel an economy from one stage to another and thence into 
rapid growth.  
For Rostow, traditional society is organized along traditional lines passed down 
from previous generations. It lacks modern scientific thought, particularly ideas of 
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causation ingrained in the Western scientific method. Production is primarily 
agricultural and technological processes are few. There is innovation, but it is haphazard 
and nonsystematic. 
The two pieces which signal that the preconditions for take-off have been met 
are the adoption in a large portion of society of scientific ideas of causation, and the 
broadening of markets which “brought not only trade, but increased specialization of 
production, increased inter-regional and international dependence, enlarged 
institutions of finance, and increased market incentives to create new production 
functions.”9 On the technical side Rostow states another precondition for society which 
is more interesting for our inquiry: there must be a build-up of social capital in 
transportation, not only for the transport of goods which enables the market expansion, 
but “also to permit the national government to effectively rule.”10 Interestingly, Rostow 
also posits that the pace of economic take off has been greatly impacted by nationalist 
ideology. Nationalist societies, that have a desire to avoid the impact of foreign power 
upon domestic issues, require economic development to fund defensive military 
growth. 
Take-off consists of rapid growth in a limited number of economy leading 
sectors. It is different from other surges in that it embodies the ideas of modern 
industrial techniques. During the take-off growth becomes a part of society’s habits and 
institutions, sustainable means of investment are devised, and the number of 
entrepreneurs and technicians are enlarged. The society must “sustain an annual rate of 
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net investment of the order of, at least, ten percent.”11 In the noneconomic realm this 
take-off also consists of the social victory of the forces of modernization over traditional 
sources of power. This victory is never total, but is enough that the inhibitors to 
modernization are sufficiently overcome to enable changes in social institutions that 
govern society. 
The drive to maturity consists of the extension of these modern processes in 
industry and investment into the remaining sectors of society. An increase of educated 
workers, equipped with scientific reasoning, is a piece of this expansion.  
Once this economic maturity is achieved, elites are faced with the question of to 
what end will this new industrial might be put. Rostow names three options to which 
this surplus may be applied: increased public measures to increase security and welfare; 
providing increased private consumption goods through mass production; or, increased 
might on the international stage. Societies choosing mass production enter upon a self-
sustaining age of mass consumption. Demand becomes the continuous engine for 
growth.  
The combination of these two ideas: investment led growth, and stages of 
development, gave rise to the idea that through a shock of investment under-developed 
nations could be pushed to the next stage. This movement to the next stage would build 
momentum that would carry them to modernity.  
Ragnar Nurske contributed a more class related stance with his observations on 
the vast rift between the rich and poor in developing nations. He felt that conspicuous 
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consumption was the primary hindrance to indigent led development. Elites who owned 
the land spent their income on consumption rather than investment in industry. But a 
point needs to be made regarding this theory. In a system with two categories of 
spending, investment or consumption, payments made to sustain patronage networks 
must be slated in the consumption category. These monies are passed down the 
patronage pyramid, with a portion being consumed at each level. Given this, it can be 
seen that the problem with lack of internal investment is not that the wealthy directly 
consume their entire income, but that income is used to secure patronage, and is then 
consumed, or distributed again and consumed. Some actors are able to invest a portion 
of their income into productive enterprise, but often the best place for them to do this 
is abroad. Local institutions of investment, and more importantly commitment, need to 
be developed before individuals with small or nonexistent patronage networks can 
invest with positive expected returns.  
Robert Solow changed the foundation of development when he declared that 
investment has a small impact on growth. Seven-eighths of growth could instead be 
attributed to technological advancement. Neo-classical development economics 
embraced a formula where income (Y) is a function of capital (K), technology (A), and 
labor (L).12  
Y = F (K, AL) 
This works well to explain growth in modern developed countries but is 
problematic when a cross section of nations is considered. To do this we must assume 
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that the production functions of the compared countries are the same, i.e., that if the 
same amounts of capital, labor and technology are put into different countries then 
outputs will be equal. Mankiw puts the assumption this way: “the production function 
should not be viewed literally as a description of a specific production process, but as a 
mapping from quantities of inputs into a quantity of output.”13 Differing levels of inputs 
present in the broad array of nations are, to him, a movement along a similar 
production function, rather than a shift to a different production function. 
However, for the idea of a universal production function to be true, this 
production function must exist at all times and in all circumstances. During peace and 
during war the same production function must rule. For if you reject the idea that the 
production function continues even in the midst of warfare then how can you grade the 
slide from total war to peace? A continuum of conflict is not amenable to a dummy 
variable which is either on or off. 
Economists who have rejected this assumption are gathering momentum in 
development economics. Institutionalists have existed outside of the mainstream for 
some time—Thorstein Veblin is a prominent example. Modern institutionalists have 
adopted a specific point which advances them into a more mainstream role: a 
transactions cost view of the differences in production functions. If in Iraq bribes must 
be paid to criminal elements in order to conduct business this increases the cost of 
doing business, conducting transactions, in that country above what costs may be in 
more developed countries. The focus of this work becomes the institutions of a nation 
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and how they assist or hinder development through a neo-classical model of prices. 
Another related theory pushes for a focus on incentives. Actors making decisions 
are driven by incentives. The effort of this theory is to unravel various incentives faced 
by different actors which create disincentives toward development14. Problems 
identified through an incentives framework are ones such as when policy intended to fix 
one problem gives rise to incentives which create another problem. In 2003 Paul 
Bremmer disbanded the semidefunct Iraqi Army. This policy was intended to be a de-
Ba’athification measure, but many analysts vilify this action as the base point of the 
rapid expansion of insurgency in Iraq. Thousands of military aged males lost their 
employment, and a primary source of identity. Although it is not hard to imagine once 
American troops withdrew, had the old Iraqi army remained, a Baathist officer corps 
conducting a coup, destroying a fledgling democracy. 
An analyst from the RAND think tank who was a part of Multi-National Force – 
Iraq regularly stressed to meeting participants on getting the incentives right; but 
“getting incentives right is not itself another new panacea for development. It is a 
principle that has to be implemented bit by bit, stripping away the encrusted layers of 
vested interest with the wrong incentives, giving entry to new people with the right 
incentives.”15 Incentives for one action can take away incentives from other actions, 
sometimes desired ones. Grants for small businesses do increase investment in small 
business, yet they also reduce the willingness of small businessmen to borrow money 
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from banks, reducing the number of bank customers, and thus reducing the desire to 
invest in banks. Many Iraqis refused loans, hoping instead to receive grants from other 
organizations. 
Considering incentives is a good tool to aid thinking in tactical decision making, 
but as a strategic tool it leaves a lot to be desired. The primary difficulty is related to a 
problem faced by communist leaders, and was expounded upon by F.A. Hayek in his 
paper on information16. He posits that there are two different types of 
knowledge/information: scientific and locational. Scientific knowledge is an 
understanding of the particular manner in which things work; natural or social laws. 
Locational knowledge is an understanding of the “particular circumstances of time and 
place.”17 Therefore, in order for a central planner to set a proper price for a commodity, 
say tin, he must not only have the scientific knowledge of how an economy functions, 
but he must also have knowledge about who needs tin, for what, and how much society 
should value that particular reason. Whereas with competitive markets these two types 
of knowledge need not be gathered in one location, the pricing mechanism sorts out all 
these problems. The factory manager in Philadelphia does not need to know that a new, 
more productive use for tin has been found in Beijing, he just sees the price of tin go up. 
Because of this, Hayek predicted a victory of competitive markets over planned markets.  
Just as communism struggled to bring together and process information at the 
proper level to make efficient decisions about pricing, people who believe in the value 
of framing incentives to solve problems at the highest levels often do not have the 
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locational information available to craft meaningful incentive schemes.  
 These different approaches attack different leverage points. Investment led 
growth programs target either infrastructure improvements or business linkages to 
provide a positive shock to inspire growth. Incentive programs use these same 
investment programs but label them as incentive based approaches, i.e., small business 
grants, supplementing private investment in specific target sectors.  In our era this 
obfuscation has become more palatable than state led investment and ownership, 
though still possessing many of the market distorting features of state ownership. 
Today’s practice has become an amalgamation of our past ideas, and though the 
names and methods vary, most programs still orbit the strategic idea that investment 
will lead to growth. Only a few programs have veered from this loadstone. One such was 
hinted at in a briefing which circulated among the US Military titled “Money as a 
Weapon System” (MAAWS).18 This briefing discussed how to use the different sources of 
funding available to commanders in order to pacify their area of responsibility. It 
discussed the efficacy of using grants and loans to build political influence and from that 
political compromise.  
 Yet even this methodology is not always productive. MAAWS has been, correctly, 
criticized for not having a firm basis in development or economic research. It is a tactic 
rather than a strategy. MAAWS, as implemented, focused on short term investments 
rather than political compromise, and some programs turned out to be 
counterproductive to long term development goals, while only moderately successful in 
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the short term.  
 How can these methods be brought together in order to harness the best 
features of each? More thought will need to be put into the setting in which 






THE STATE OF NATURE 
Economists are familiar with the nineteenth century ideas of Bentham and Mill, 
that humans are decision makers who maximize their utility. Economic models assume 
rational actors but they often decline to delve into the locational and social bounds on 
this rationality.  
Ideas of Thomas Hobbes are often absent in modern economics. John Locke’s 
social contract, a voluntary union of citizens, makes more sense in a democratic 
capitalist society and has taken the day. Though once we venture outside the developed 
world, the ideas of Hobbes assume a more vibrant character. Integrating these ideas 
into models of economic development will dramatically improve the efficacy of 
development programs. 
For Hobbes, the world is one of unrestrained freedom. Each person possesses 
the ability to, at any time, take any action. The only natural laws are those of nature. 
Physical laws which man cannot surmount. Concepts of basic human rights are 
constructs that persistent ideologues have imagined and realized on this foundation of 
conflict. 
In this state of nature each individual is responsible only for themselves. Each 
takes intentional action based on their personal interests, much like rational choice 
utility theory. Still, in this state of unrestrained freedom there is also unrestrained 




problematic. “In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof 
is uncertain… and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; 
And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”19 In this freedom there 
can be no society, or organization without violence. What one man claims, another may 
take through greater force. A Darwinian conflict reigns supreme. Individuals find 
themselves in a constant state of war.  
Each individual is reliant upon themselves to secure their own claims, and 
freedom. It is a system of self-help. In this situation, if you claim a particular asset which 
will produce a stream of benefits into the future, then in order to realize those benefits 
you must ensure your claim will remain valid in the future. To do this “there is no way 
for any man to secure himselfe, so reasonable, as Anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, 
to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great 
enough to endanger him”.20 Another implication of this is that the individual will only be 
willing to invest in the improvement of an asset to the point that they expect they will 
be able to defend their claim to the fruits of investment in the future. Expected future 
benefits must exceed expected costs. The risk of expropriation limits investment in the 
same fashion as the risk of business failure. For this reason warlords accrue power to 
themselves. Any means are legitimized. Slavery, double dealing, lies. “Force, and Fraud, 
are in warre the two Cardinall vertues.”21 This is the harsh equality which is often found 
in weak and stateless societies, yet it is hardly mentioned in economic development 
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“To this warre of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that 
nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there 
no place. Where there is no common Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no 
Injustice.”22 The state, Hobbes’ Leviathan, ensures order through the creation, and 
enforcement, of laws. Once these laws are created by the state it becomes mandatory 
for the populace to conform to these laws, else they are justly punished by the state, 
which is more powerful than they. Hobbes has located the legitimacy of these laws 
within the idea of his state of nature. Legitimacy does come from the barrel of a gun in 
this case. No law that can be easily flouted is legitimate. Without force there is no order, 
and therefore no legitimacy. However, with force laws become a powerful tool for 
individuals to organize power relationships based on rules, rather than ever changing 
comparisons of strength.  
We have only succeeded in overcoming the anarchy and warlordism inherent to 
the state of nature through governance; governance which limits individual freedom in 
order to expand the ability of individuals to work together; to achieve greater things 
than they would otherwise be able. Trade and organization enable the efficiencies of 
specialization and the benefits of self-interested action. Governance is the basis of 
cooperation.  
We have often seen that when governance is cast down mankind reverts to 
tribal practices and relational enforcement mechanisms. The destruction of Roman 
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order preceded the Dark Ages, the destruction of Soviet order preceded a long slide for 
Eastern Europe, and the destruction of the Ba’athist regime in Iraq predicated the 
implosion of Iraq’s economy. 
Under what conditions is an investor likely to invest? If there are no laws, only 
individuals who can forcefully protect their investments are likely to invest. Yet, these 
are the same people who do not need to invest, as they can expropriate wealth from 
others. Facing these incentives, burying bullion in the backyard becomes a more rational 
choice for less powerful groups and individuals. In Iraq, the 3rd Squadron, 4th US 
Cavalry Regiment created a program in 2009 to educate “mattress millionaires” on the 
benefits of investment over hording23. Many of these potential investors felt they would 
lose their wealth should it become known they possessed it. 
Another example is in property.  Valuation of property in Iraq plummeted as the 
insurgency gained momentum. Without disinterested third party enforcement of 
property rights exchanging deeds became pointless. In areas where ethnic militias 
actively evicted non-member families, occupation by force became common; squatters 
reigned supreme.  
Curtis Milhaupt and Mark West, professors of law, published24 on the 
intersection of government and criminal enforcement. They demonstrate, through data 
collected in Japan, that the Yakuza, Japanese organized crime, has the most influence in 
areas of dispute resolution where the government has the least amount of presence. 
They argue that organized crime is “an entrepreneurial response to inefficiencies in the 
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property rights and enforcement framework supplied by the state.”25 
The inefficiencies of the Japanese legal system run across a number of sectors: 
bankruptcy, debt collection, landlord-tenant issues, shareholders’ rights, dispute 
intermediaries, and entrepreneurial finance. All of which now have some connection 
with organized crime rather than being a state monopoly. “Thus, in many ways, 
organized criminal firms are the missing transaction cost engineers in the Japanese 
system.”26 
When the state is absent warlordism and concomitant trials of strength through 
violence are the norm. The difference between a nation like Japan and anywhere else in 
the world is the extent of the state, and its ability to drive out competitors. Most other 
nations have even less complete state structures as well as less ability to drive out 
competition. 
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UNDERPINNINGS OF RATIONAL CHOICE 
Prior to the January 2005 elections in Iraq a politician was asked about his party’s 
economic platform and he replied: “An economic plan is not a priority…. The priority is 
security. Any words on the economy are ignored by Iraqis. Iraq is looking for security 
only, so when a man’s son goes to school he comes home safely, when his wife goes to 
the market she comes home safely.”27 Obviously a noneconomic decision matrix has 
been prioritized in Iraq. 
With a Hobbesian framework we can see that there is a realist interpretation of 
economic decision making; realist in the terms of international relations, power 
relationships govern all, and rational self-interest is the magnetic pole attracting 
decision making. In places with laws and credible enforcement power these impulses 
can be directed into efficient economic competition rather than power. In this milieu 
liberal ideas then come to the fore and appear to be the defining characteristics of 
interaction between individuals. 
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs28 is an important concept when trying to discern 
the motivations of action in this muddle. Many factors which bound rational decision 
making are embedded in his theory. The five needs are physiological, safety, love, 
esteem and self-actualization. 
Physiological needs are anything necessary to ensure continued biological 
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functioning. These include nutrition, sleep, basic clothing and shelter. The lack of these 
needs will lead to death through starvation or exposure. The second need is for safety; 
protection from pain, injury, and death are the highlights of this category. Security also 
includes ensuring continued access to the means of fulfilling physiological needs. Love is 
the third need. Not limited to romantic notions of love, but also including the need for 
relationships which produce a feeling of belongingness. Securing a place in a group 
becomes paramount to fulfill this need. Fourth are esteem needs. The need for respect 
among compatriots drives fulfillment of this need. The fifth need is self-actualization. 
The desire for self-fulfillment, to do what the individual is fitted for. “What a man can 
be, he must be.”29 
These needs are ordered by priority of desired fulfillment. Physiological needs, 
such as hunger, will trump less essential needs such as love or self-actualization until 
this need is met. The emergence of later needs occurs as more basic needs become 
increasingly satisfied. Maslow realized that there is no particular line at which one need 
can be said to be satiated. Each individual exists along a continuum where some needs 
are fulfilled more or less than others. Also, some individuals, who had encountered a 
surfeit of satisfaction in some needs, may have the ranking of their hierarchy modified. 
An important idea that Maslow elucidates is that even the philosophical outlook 
of the individual will be impacted by either the lack or surfeit of fulfillment of basic 
desires. Fulfilling unsatiated needs will become an overwhelming locus, driving 
behavior. 
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A great number of development practices are focused on developing capitalist, 
democratic systems. Problematically in many cases this approach skips over more the 
basic needs of the population and the circumstances in which the population is 
enmeshed. Maslow compares individuals with unsatisfied basic needs to those 
diagnosed with maladies of malnourishment, such as scurvy. “He is as surely sick as if he 
had suddenly developed a strong salt-hunger or calcium hunger.”30 Yet, regardless, we 
expect them to sprint across the finish line into a capitalist democratic society through 
the implementation of elections and elimination of the state role in the economy. No 
wonder transition countries have so often run aground. 
Theory, also, has largely glossed over this hierarchy. A nod is given to rational 
choice, but not to the basis of rationality. A problem faced in encouraging the 
establishment of capitalist democratic systems is connecting theories with reality. It is 
probably true that a capitalist democratic system would bring needed solutions to 
problems these societies face; yet, it is more important what indigenous individuals 
believe, and can achieve within the bounds on choice they face.  
Is it likely that democratic systems implemented in societies which lack basic 
necessities or security will lead to the desired democracy? More often we have seen the 
rise of demagoguery and populism from efforts to secure democracy through elections, 
let alone the hurdles faced when traditional sociological structures, which provide a 
sense of belonging and esteem for many individuals, are deemed antidemocratic, and 
slated for removal. Bringing to mind the problem of the Ba’athist Iraqi Army. Many men 
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found their identity, comradeship and esteem from their ranks and positions in that 
army; in addition to a source of income which provided their livelihood. Without it, they 
became unemployed, and lost a primary means to satisfy a diverse array of needs. It is 
no surprise they turned to alternate sources; including the insurgency. Yet, the Iraqi 
Army was a tool used by the Baath party to ensure its continued rule. Military coups 
have been historically common in the Middle East. If the army had been left in place 
what was the likelihood of a coup, especially had our stay in Iraq been as brief as 
originally planned? 
The absence of theory is problematic because theory supplies tools necessary for 
argument. Without those tools we turn to unfocused pragmatics, without a firm 
foundation in either economic or political sciences. Understanding the underlying logic 
of rational choice is essential for comprehensive theory. Individuals or groups without 
food or security are not likely to make the same decisions as those with a surfeit of 
material wealth, even when presented with the same opportunities. Even within a 
society there are haves and have-nots. These divisions within a nation will impact the 






A MODEL OF EXPROPRIATION 
Bates, Grief, and Singh (2002) build a number of models to demonstrate the 
interactions of violence and production in a stateless society. Time is a limited 
commodity in any society, which individuals must choose how to invest. Therefore, a 
production trade-off is faced by individuals. Should they produce wealth through labor? 
Hone a capacity for violence? Or should they produce nothing and enjoy their time as 
leisure? The expected ex-post balance of power plays a central role in this decision. 
Wealth produces utility. But capacity for violence enables the expropriation of wealth 
created by others. In this case the third option, leisure, which cannot be expropriated, 
may be the dominant strategy. The rules set in this model are a little abstract, but are 
not unreasonable. The most interesting result of their analysis is they “uncover a 
fundamental trade-off in the political economy of stateless societies.  In such societies, 
we find, poverty can be the price of peace.”31 
Their model plays through in the following fashion: should an individual produce 
wealth, then the expected reward to individuals who have produced a capacity for 
violence is increased. With this increased reward more individuals should choose to 
produce a capacity for violence instead of wealth or leisure. However, as the capacity 
for violence increases, then the rewards to raiding are reduced, both because of the 
increased number of individuals choosing to produce capacity for violence and the 
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reduced number of individuals producing wealth. At this point the third option, 
producing leisure, becomes a dominant strategy for maximizing utility. This reveals a link 
between stateless societies and poverty. In a dynamic model, with multiple periods, any 
movement towards production is expected to be met with violence and disorder. 
This is a startling conclusion; that the accumulation of wealth in a stateless 
society will be accompanied by a rise in violence. Conflictingly, we have seen in 
development theory and practice the opposite claim, that a rising level of wealth is tied 
to peace and prosperity.  How are these views to be reconciled? It is apparent that 
affluent societies enjoy the benefits of peace, and less economically developed societies 
are often the locus of battle. It seems antithetical to suggest that investment, ceteris 
paribus, will lead to conflict. So, how to explain this schism?   
Bates, Grief and Singh take the first step when they introduce a specialist in 
violence, a Leviathan, to the mix. They demonstrate that a specialist in violence with a 
mandate to protect wealth from expropriation is a Pareto dominant strategy. This 
service is remunerated by wealth producers through a tax, or tribute, paid to the 
violence specialist. The level of the tax needs to be such that it is in the interest of the 
violence specialist to continue enforcing rules rather than engaging in raiding activity. 
This specialist is deterred from plunder by two expected costs. First, raiding by the 
violence specialist would destroy the expected future value of payments for protection, 
and second, this would encourage producers to switch into building capacity for 
violence, lowering the returns from any tax.   




viable alternative to leisure, increasing the wealth of society. This indeed reflects 
Hobbes’ world, with a concern for extra-societal raiding, and the incentive for the local 
violence specialist to increase its power in order to protect this wealth and dominate 
the wealth of other societies.  
Thus, in order to escape the poverty trap of persistent conflict it is necessary to 
erect a specialist in violence; and then empower this specialist to enforce order within 
as large an area as it can reasonably dominate. This sounds similar to Weber’s definition 
of sovereignty given earlier.  
Further economic benefits are realized with the creation of a specialist in 
violence other than simple protection from expropriation. Given a sliding level of trust 
where those closer and more known are ranked more trustworthy than outsiders, there 
will exist a corresponding level of propensity toward ensuring these outsiders do not 
gain power relative to trusted insiders. Outsiders cannot be trusted to remain peaceful, 
if they should gain power relative to insiders they can be expected to dominate this 
inside group through whatever means available.  So, in any contracts, or economic 
activity, relative gains of the insiders versus outsiders will be an essential strategic 
calculation towards the feasibility of a deal.  As the expectation of the ability of 
outsiders to enforce domination is lowered then absolute gains become more 
attractive. Therefore a specialist in violence which enforces commitments can reduce 
balance of power considerations, enabling positive sum games to be considered.   
The negotiation of an oil law in Iraq is an example of one such problem. Kurds 




All will gain money and power from its passage, but some will gain more than others. 
The conflict between Kurds and Arabs is the best example. The Kurds fear that should 
Arabs gain primary control of oil revenues, without a deal on reorganizing the Iraqi 
Army, then this money will be used to fund Arab units which may, someday, march on 
Arbil. While the Arabs do not fear the threat of a Kurdish attack so acutely, they are 
concerned with the threat of empowered separatist Kurds breaking away from Iraq. 
Contract enforcement is an area where the state functions as an essential third 
party enforcement mechanism. The power of the state, as the specialist in violence, can 
be used to ensure a third party is available to guarantee and enforce contracts. 
Contracts are a pivotal point of transactions and economics as a whole. 
How does the state achieve dominance and create an environment of 
cooperation? Just through its existence? It is readily apparent that the tax rate is a 
flimsy guardian of order. If dollars spent on infrastructure and microgrants risk 
increasing the value of the prize and fueling conflict then, perhaps, the most productive 
strategy in fostering development is to focus directly on reducing raiding through two 
means: first, assisting the specialist in violence to punish raiding within their territory, 
and, second, encouraging structures which ensure that the specialist refrains from 
plunder. 
Visible institutions of laws are necessary, and organizations of enforcement. At 
this juncture development assistance is required by many nations throughout the world. 
Yet these visible institutions and organizations must conform to invisible local 




Foreign aid has had difficulty in achieving this local support. Externally imposed 
structures are not likely to last. Only by proffering our understanding of alternate, and 
more successful, strategies of organization can we assist local leaders to improve extant 






INSTITUTIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND BELIEFS 
“And this also… has been one of the darkest places of the earth.”32 Marlow, 
before delving into the depths of Africa, mused that even the banks of the Thames were 
once anarchic wilderness; a place where Roman legionnaires struggled, and died, to 
impose rule on a tribal people. Yet now, London is a focal point of world capitalism, 
even though England had been as savage and unknown as the depths of Africa. How was 
this darkness lifted? 
The previous sections have elucidated the necessity for a third party, the state, 
to provide order amidst anarchy; a specialist in violence. But how is this implemented in 
actuality? How can such a specialist be created, and more importantly, restrained? Early 
in human development personal relationships were able to control violence. In small 
communities information on others is readily available and self-help is efficacious. Tribal 
systems are an early means to expand these personal network arrangements to 
accommodate a growing population, but with continued growth these systems grow 
unwieldy and become a less viable means of control. An organized state becomes a 
crucial means of controlling violence. 
North, Wallis, and Weingast in Violence and Social Orders have built a model to 
illuminate how mankind has overcome Hobbesian anarchy. For them, the central 
problem of society is how to control violence. They place the nexus of control in the 
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entity of the state. They posit that the state is a supra-network of institutions, enforced 
by organizations. The differences in development outcomes for various states are 
dependent upon the efficacy of this system in supporting organizational forms 
necessary for economic growth, while at the same time controlling noneconomic 
competition.  
They open with evidence that modern nations are not wealthy because of higher 
growth rates than those of less developed states, but rather “because they greatly 
reduced the episodes of negative growth.”33 Stability is the key to wealth. Dazzling rates 
of growth of many developing nations have been dashed on the rocks of dissent rather 
than contributing to long term prosperity. This observation fits in with our earlier 
thought experiment where we saw how increased wealth can lead to higher payoffs to 
violence and thence increasing struggle. 
Some definitions are in order to ensure clarity. Too often institutions and 
organizations are lumped together and in-depth analysis of each goes unexamined. 
What goes overlooked is the third element of this tripod, social belief structures. These 
three supports act in concert. When one is shifted, all shift in reaction. 
An institution is a system of rules and expectations by which individuals and 
organizations organize their activities. “Institutions are the ‘rules of the game’ (North, 
1990, pp. 3-4), the patterns of interaction that govern and constrain the relationships of 
individuals.”34 These may or may not be codified. Institutions are not self-enforcing. 
They may designate punishments but are reliant on organizations to carry these out. 
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An organization is an arrangement of individuals who work in concert to achieve 
organizational goals. “[O]rganizations consist of specific groups of individuals pursuing a 
mix of common and individual goals through partially coordinated behavior.”35 It is not 
required for the individuals to have common goals, but it is necessary for an effective 
organization to have some sort of leadership structure which will decide upon the goals 
which the organization will pursue.  The advantages for organizing are either to exploit 
specialization or to provide group reinforcing motivation.  Organizations can be very 
diverse, from very structured hierarchies to rapidly shifting conglomerations.   
How groups organize depends on many factors, including the institutions of the 
group; beliefs of the society in which they operate; the purpose to which they are 
aligned; and, the nature of their competitors. For example, where conflict is a definite 
possibility weaker organizations will be decentralized in order to reduce the impact of 
leadership losses due to attacks of stronger opponents. Or, decentralization may occur 
in places with greater benefits to quick localized action. Where gains can be made from 
specialization, centralized forms of leadership dominate.36 
Though only mentioned tangentially in Violence and Social Orders, I put forward 
that beliefs are a third, necessary element in this structure, and support institutions and 
organizations. Beliefs are very similar to institutions, except that they exist inside the 
minds of the individual rather than being an external influence upon the individual. 
Institutions are an external, visible, set of rules, while beliefs are an internal, invisible, 
idea of how the world does or should work; which can be as binding a set of restraints 
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as external institutions enforced by organizations. Cognitive psychology has a theory 
which illustrates this concept; self-efficacy theory demonstrates through clinical study 
how an individual’s belief in their ability to do something is more important to success 
than actual ability37.  Beliefs encompass not only efficacy but also ideas of right and 
wrong, a sense of justice in a group, lauding some norms of behavior and castigating 
others. There must be individuals who identify that an institution is the proper way to 
comport themselves and that particular organizations are the best way to realize these 
beliefs. Then they align themselves into these organizations to implement these beliefs, 
creating, changing and destroying previous institutions, organizations and beliefs. 
The US Department of Defense, after cultural missteps in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
saw the need for a better understanding of indigent culture, and sought to build Human 
Terrain Teams (HTTs) filled with social science researchers, primarily anthropologists, to 
conduct cultural research and advise military units in the field. The American Association 
of Anthropologists is, as the name suggests, an organization of anthropologists. This 
association called for a boycott against participation on HTTs, which drove up the cost of 
the program dramatically. Primarily, this conflict came about not because of 
institutional or organizational conflict, both purport to desire a society based on local 
participatory democracy which supports human rights, but rather a conflict of beliefs on 
how to achieve that goal. 
North, Wallis, and Weingast mention beliefs as motives for behavior, yet 
purposefully do not delve too deeply. They are satisfied with examining external 
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behavior rather than internal origins of behavior. However, without motivators to 
inspire behavior these institutions and organizations will crumble and fade, inspiring no 
more dread, or obedience, than Shelley’s Ozymandias. 
North, Wallis, and Weingast describe a spectrum of states and compare their 
success in controlling violence and building prosperity based on the ability of state 
institutions to foster support for organizations. They model the evolution of how states 
improve themselves and then cross a tipping point into stability and prosperity. Their 
base unit is the “natural state” where elites have come together and created institutions 
and organizations which can regulate interactions among themselves. Elites submit to 
this third party in order to gain benefits they would be unable to procure alone.  
These states have two strategic methods to reduce violence. The first method is 
to increase the expected costs of violent behavior; the second is to increase the 
expected rewards of nonviolent behavior. Reducing violence involves revaluing the 
rewards matrix of independent actors adding weight toward the rewards of production 
rather than of violence. For weak states, it is often impracticable for the state to enforce 
punishments. Violent actors may be more powerful than the state, or the costs of 
detection and punishment are unreasonable or beyond the capacity of the state, 
impacting the credibility of punishment. Therefore the most often used mechanisms in 
weak states come from the second method, creating and controlling rents generated by 
nonviolent behavior.   
The ability of the state to control access to the rents generated by organizations 




charismatically based, institutions move the state into new, more developed, 
categories; culminating in a mature natural state. They acknowledge that this is not a 
linear preordained process through which states evolve; but rather a back and forth, 
sputtering, and often failing, process. The key to prosperity is the strengthening of 
enforcement organizations, and the expansion of access to organizational forms to the 
populace.  As the state is able to offer greater and greater access to support for 
organizations, while simultaneously minimizing violence, the entire society prospers. 
Critically they do not believe that this process necessitates a confrontation where elites 
are forced to relinquish their rights, but rather can incorporate scenarios in which 
expanding the rights of citizens to construct organizations supported by the state is in 
the interest of elites.38 
The tipping point into the modern prosperity of the West comes when a society 
becomes an “open access order.” In an open access order the ability to create state 
supported organizations is open to all members of a nation, regardless of social 
standing. Elite privileges are transformed into impersonal rights of all citizens. This 
unleashes the ability of all individuals to utilize these powerful organizational tools, 
outside the purview of the state, to pursue private goals.  
 The model they describe is useful. It lays out a path for development successes. 
They advise development practitioners to increase the ability of the state to facilitate 
organizational forms and to expand access to these forms to the entire population. 
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However, the focus of their model pushes all of this power and responsibility to the 
state. Other means of providing support for institutions are neglected. They build a 
Platonic nationalist society without conflicting social structures and call it peace. 
North, Wallis, and Weingast lay out a very good argument linking state support 
for organizations and successful development. Still, I feel that they have failed to 
examine the larger sociological tapestry. The state does not have a monopoly on 
institutional support for organizations and rarely, except in cases of totalitarianism, 
exerts effort to influence the belief structures of citizens. They do not examine the role 
of nonstate entities and the conflict that develops between competing institutional 
structures based on differing beliefs of the populace in developing societies.  
Violence and Social Orders is extremely state centric. This view is very Western, 
sublimating the role of religion and other such nexuses. It seems to usher in a view 
similar to Fukuyama’s End of History rather than Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations. 
Throughout human history the state has been only one nexus around which institutions, 
organizations and beliefs cluster. Tribalism and religion are also able to support 
organizations through a construct of beliefs, institutions and organizations. Additionally, 
any area which the state neglects, or refuses to enter, will become a point where other 
violence based systems, such as gangs, will thrive. These entities need not necessarily 
end at a strictly defined national border, and struggle among them is not limited to 
Westphalian state conflict. In any given physical space multiple independent sets of 
institutions, organizations and beliefs are operant39.  
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We need better tools to organize our thoughts about effective development 
practices; tools that encompass the experience of struggling nations in which most 
development work occurs. When industrial and technological advancements clash with 
established ideas and organizations, then development is retarded. In a contorted web 
of needs, beliefs, and power, ignoring the role of competing structures will lead to less 
efficient, and in some cases counterproductive, practices.  
Avner and Kandel found, in research on the transition economies of Eastern 
European formerly socialist states, that desired success never materialized because: “In 
devising transition policies, Western economists have implicitly assumed the existence 
of a market economy and hence, by and large, they have ignored the policy implications 
of the need to create markets.”40 Assuming markets exist is again the assumption of a 
Westphalian state. They saw that when technocratic policies of privatization, and 
democratization, entered a showdown with a violent, and relational, state of nature, 
chaos was the result. They conclude: “To foster growth there is an urgent need to devise 
and influence private order institutions and legal mechanisms that would enable small 
firms to credibly commit themselves to respect their contractual obligations.”41  
Commitment has always been a central facet of human interaction. How 
individuals commit to present and future action with regards to an uncertain future is a 
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mainstay of most social structures. The advancement of governance can be viewed as 
the evolution of commitment. For Hobbes, without a state there is no injustice, and 
hence no commitment: “[W]here there is no Common-wealth, there nothing is Unjust. 
So that the nature of Justice, consisteth in keeping of valid Covenants: but the Validity of 
Covenants begins not but with the Constitution of a Civill Power, sufficient to compell 
men to keep them: And then it is also that Propriety begins.”42 From this rises the 
difficulty faced in modern times of operating in ungoverned zones of conflict. 
Making commitments, resolving disputes, and enforcing compliance are crucial 
pieces of commitment. Contrary to Hobbes and other thinkers, a state is not the only 
nexus capable of supporting commitment, rather it is the primary nexus in modern 
Western societies. I will call a nexus amalgamating the three processes of commitments 
a commitment regime. This includes: codification of what consists of a commitment, a 
process for resolving disputes over the terms of the commitment, and a method of 
enforcing violations of commitments. Each of these steps involves a transaction cost. 
As stated, commitment regimes are not the sole province of politically created 
legal structures. Commitment regimes are also found in divinely inspired religious 
structures; relationship based traditional familial constructs, present in many tribal 
forms; and informal groups, characterized by explicit threats and use of violence, found 
in gangs and organized crime. Delimiting categorical boundaries between political legal 
structures and systems based on explicit threats of violence can be difficult. Similarly, 
there is not a bright line dividing traditional relationship structures and religious 
                                                          
42





A good lens through which to examine the differences and similarities between 
these commitment regime categories is Max Weber’s thoughts on charisma and 
bureaucracy.43 For Weber institutional change is implemented through charismatic 
means against embedded bureaucratic power. Once changes are implemented, actors 
then attempt to rationalize and bureaucratize new rules in order to solidify the changes. 
Using his framework to examine commitment regimes we can see gangs as charismatic 
movements building similar powers to those built by states. We can see as well that to a 
certain extent new religious systems are charismatic based changes to traditional tribal 
and familial practices.  
When systems are rationalized, and bureaucratized, there often is compromise 
among competing charismatic systems to reduce conflict and realize individual gains. 
Thus we see that bureaucratic systems are generally amalgamations of numerous 
charismatic systems. What we refer to as states are the remains of numerous, violence 
based, charismatic movements, while tribes and traditional practices are often 
remnants of many charismatic divinely inspired systems. Regardless of origin, each 
competes for adherents. Each commitment made using a particular commitment regime 
validates and strengthens the institutions, organizations and beliefs of the structure.   
Governmental commitment regimes are generally applied to all individuals who 
reside within a specific geographic area; though, in weak states, there is often 
contention over this designation. Gang commitment regimes are informal violence 
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based systems which fill in the cracks of government regimes. There is no monopoly of 
violence in any society; realms where entry cost is low and profits are high there will be 
entry. When governments decline to enforce contracts, such as for illegal transactions, 
gangs often step in. Whether people submit to governments or gangs depends on the 
capabilities of these types of regimes.  
Tribal commitment regimes are regimes which extend among individuals related 
by blood and conceptually identifying with tribal leadership. These tribal leaders can and 
often do engage with other tribal leaders to resolve intratribal conflicts. However, these 
leaders are often ignored, or relegated to lower status, by national political leaders.  
Religious commitment regimes bring together individuals united through their 
belief in a common doctrine of divine revelation as to the purpose of man and/or the 
consequences for present actions in the afterlife. Often these commitment regimes 
posit an infallible ruler or system which will unerringly punish transgressors. Religious 
commitment regimes can minimize enforcement costs based on this belief. 
Difficulties arise when there are deals to be made across regime boundaries; the 
enforcement problem comes up again. This builds intraregime conflict, at higher levels 
leading to Huntington’s clash of civilizations. I see these forces behind two powerful 
historic phenomena: the rise of messianic religions and imperialism. In the first case, 
commerce is facilitated by both parties holding the same religious system; if both 
parties believe that an infallible God will unerringly punish transgressors then the cost of 
enforcement is low. Therefore, expansion of religious doctrine by the sword begins to 




posit that the adoption of Christianity by the Roman Empire extended the life of the 
empire by reducing transaction cost of commitment. In the second case, governments 
trying to expand the reach of their commitment regime mechanisms embodied in 
national laws and courts subjugate newly discovered lands in order to enable 
commerce. If the local system is not able to reliably guarantee contracts then the 
system of the imperialist nation is imposed.  
A modern case of commitment regime expansion is embodied in globalization. 
Globalization is expanding the ability to make commitments across national boundaries, 
facilitating international commitments and thus commerce. Trade courts have been 
established in the World Trade Organization, and imbued with authority to enforce their 
rulings. 
Thinking in terms of commitment regimes is useful for development efforts. The 
goal of building democratic capitalism in conflicted areas has proven elusive and difficult 
to measure. Practitioners need a better framework to guide decision making and data 
collection. Increasing efficiency of commitment regimes appears to be a more useful 
strategy than the continued focus on investment led growth. To assess this claim we 
must ask: what makes a theory useful for practitioners? Then we can explore if a 
commitment regime focus can provide this utility.  
First, a theory must lend itself to measurability. The most successful 
organizations track successes and failures in order to learn and improve actions and 
ideas. Second, a theory needs to have some idea of where it is going and how to get 




ideologically fulfilling, without this, gathering the requisite support is not likely to 
happen. Fourth is sustainability, the latest catch phrase in international development, 
projects which require ongoing external support having fallen into disfavor. Fifth, and 
finally, in the current economic climate an essential element is a theory’s ability to 
deliver results with a small investment. Multibillion dollar development commitments 
are an inconstant star, for who can predict when political conditions will allow these 
expenditures. 
A commitment regime focus lends itself well to measurement, but, each of the 
four types (governmental, religious, tribal, gang) must be gauged in regards to the 
physical area of desired effect. Each type should be assessed at the beginning of a 
campaign in regards to the three pillars of commitment regimes: making commitments, 
dispute resolution and enforcement. Through building this community commitment 
matrix the observer will have a base point from which to measure improvements. A 
related measure of effectiveness would be to try to come to an understanding of the 
number of commitments. As the efficiency of a commitment regime increases we 
should expect the number of commitments utilizing that regime to go up. Even the 
process of gathering this number is a good first step in the process of making 
commitment regimes more useful. Organizations which make up commitment regimes 
often possess this information through information gathered in the making of 
commitments. Entities that do not possess this information are not being utilized 
effectively for the making of commitments. Ease of business registration in the Western 




registered, they commit to reporting business activity and in return are guaranteed 
certain rights by the government, including the use of the court system to arbitrate and 
enforce contractual commitments.  
Activity on lines of effort in a commitment regime approach can in some cases 
run concurrently; but, at others, are more effective being implemented after other lines 
have advanced to a certain point. A primary line of effort is a focus on reforming 
business laws of the indigent political commitment regime. Developing the primary 
modern commitment nexus, government should start by redrafting business, finance, 
and even property laws. Once this line has started to produce reforms another line of 
effort should be activated: educating current and potential businessmen on the changed 
laws. Else, in the confusion of transition, numerous opportunities may be lost. A third 
line of effort is to connect financial organizations, international and domestic, with 
effective local commitment regimes. An example of the success of this can be seen in 
the success of microfinance. Instead of relying on inefficient political/governmental 
commitment regimes microfinance relies on enforcement by local tribal/family regimes. 
Hawalaat are another means of finance which rely on traditional systems such as family 
or religion rather than political/governmental court systems. The specific required lines 
of effort enacted are dependent on local conditions. Still, the focus of these efforts 
should be to improve the three pieces of commitments: making commitments, resolving 
disputes, and enforcing resolution.  
As for the ideological attractiveness of commitment regime improvement, the 




opportunity in an economy. Increasing the ability for individuals to make choices and 
commitments is favorably looked upon and aligns with the current international 
environment which calls for increased freedoms. A drawback may be seen in the push to 
increasing enforcement abilities of some undesirable organizations. 
Sustainability, while important, is a subjective assessment. Entropy and change 
seem to be the only constants in the world; even the Roman Empire crumbled. If we 
define sustainability as self-perpetuation, then, in order for anything to be sustainable, 
there must be some sort of commitment regime in place. These regimes are what 
enable sustainability. A primary caveat for constructing sustainable commitment 
regimes is that these regimes must align with the belief structures of the groups which 
will remain in the area. As discussed earlier, when local ideas and beliefs are 
incorporated with institutions and organizations these structures will stand. 
Finally, cost is an important element of calculation as budgets are finite, 
especially in a political environment of government spending cuts. The advantage of 
commitment regimes is ambiguous in this area. While this approach does not 
necessitate physical construction it will still require staff and advisors. The value of a 
commitment regime outlook, in this respect, is in its scalability. Investment-shock 
growth theory calls for significant initial investment. If the investment gap is not bridged 
then investment will not lead to sustained growth.  Commitment regimes are a more 
gradual process of advisement and shaping. Efforts, such as a big investment push, 
which stress immediacy, often fail to achieve desired effects.  




work, there are some opposing arguments. One such is why should we create new 
category in a production function for commitment regimes rather than conceptualizing 
them as a facet of technology? Commitment regimes could be envisioned as simply the 
application of commitment technology, and that once discovered could be put to use by 
any organization. A process for guaranteeing commitment is still a process and not 
vastly different than a process to organize and operate a factory.  
This argument is logically sound. However, enforcing commitment is rarely as 
value neutral as a technological process used to produce a new widget. Furthermore, 
commitment regimes underlie and perhaps even dictate to a certain extent what 
processes may be adopted by a society. A Leninist society has no operant way to adopt 
the capitalist technological process to operate a bank.  
 Another criticism is that a focus on commitment regimes may be too 
sympathetic to dictatorship and tyranny, that this focus may lead to a decoupling of 
development and democracy. In this argument development is not achievable without 
political freedoms. 
This linkage is a sacred cow of the Western development community, and, 
beyond that, in popular thought. Any government pondering increasing its economic 
outlook is blatantly advised that democratization is the only path. While it is true that 
the Western nations which are more economically developed are democracies, it is not 
true to say that democratization is required for development. Germany, Japan, and 
South Korea are examples of nations which developed rapidly under authoritarian 




problem Friedrich List considered in the nineteenth century. List claimed the opposite, 
that industrialization would foster liberalism, yet he could never definitively prove 
causation rather than simply correlation.44 The experiences of Germany, Japan, and 
South Korea seem to provide more evidence for an argument that industrialization leads 
to liberalization rather than democratization leading to growth. 
Nevertheless, in the long run, democracy has proven more stable, and each of 
these three nations made the transition to democracy at some point in their 
development. While democratization is a good tool for growth enhancing stability, it is 
not the only possible path to foster development; especially when rapidly introduced 
democracy leads to demagoguery and turmoil. 
Fostering commitment regimes appears on the surface to be neutral, and maybe 
beneficial, towards dictatorships when implementation supports state apparatuses of 
enforcement. However, many times nations have arrived into dictatorship and 
totalitarianism because commitment institutions were weak or failing, not because they 
were strong and well connected to local beliefs. The primary nexus that development 
practitioners should focus on is the dynamic between state power and market 
economics. A state with the ability to enforce contracts also has the ability to 
expropriate wealth. Should practitioners support and improve democratic commitment 
regimes, which restrain the expropriative power of the state, then growth of a 
democratic society can be established. 
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COIN DEVELOPMENT DOCTRINE 
The interaction of development and violence is most clear in the churn of 
insurrection. Doctrine is a good place to examine the methodology applied by the 
counter-insurgent, often the international community, and compare it to a commitment 
regime approach. Current doctrine has neglected the role of institutions, organizations, 
and beliefs in economic development, leaving these ideas to political officers rather 
than economic ones. The result of this imbalance is inefficient economic institutions 
which do not serve the society well, and hinder the establishment of sustainable 
indigenous practices. 
The guiding purpose of counter insurgency (COIN) action is “to build popular 
support for a government while suppressing or co-opting insurgent movements.”45 
United States Government COIN doctrine describes best practices as a mixture of 
security, economic development and information actions, all guided by a political plan.46 
The goal of these actions is to enable the indigent government to control its 
environment. This will lead the population to support the government rather than 
insurgent forces. 
While this approach does note the interconnectivity of political, economic, 
security and information spheres it lacks a clear description of how these factors link 
together. A commitment regime construct gives a more clear vision of what tasks need 
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to be accomplished in order to enable economic development in a society and link them 
to political development. Political efforts are necessary to create institutions and 
organizations, supported by local belief structures, in order to foster economic growth. 
COIN doctrine describes the sphere of economic development as: “immediate 
humanitarian relief and the provision of essential services such as safe water, sanitation, 
basic health care, livelihood assistance, and primary education, as well as longer-term 
programs for development of infrastructure to support agricultural, industrial, 
educational, medical and commercial activities.”47 This description focuses practitioners’ 
attention on three primary spheres of development: humanitarian relief, essential 
services, and infrastructure. All three of these spheres are geared towards a Rosenstein-
Rodan Big Push capital investment effort. None look to improve commitment regime 
efficiency.  
Doctrine says that development agencies should conduct an ”in depth 
assessment of the back ground situation followed by the application of program 
management tools to give continuous evaluation and adjustment.”48 How this should be 
done is not indicated. In fact, the scant page and a half devoted to economic 
development primarily notes the difficulties that will be encountered, due to the 
security environment, rather than any sort of prescriptive strategic advice. 
US military COIN development doctrine is based on the idea that: “Economic 
recovery begins with an actively engaged labor force.”49 The methodology is focused 
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directly on two immediate problems: militants recruiting from the pool of unemployed 
labor to conduct attacks, and the disgruntlement of an unemployed populace. “A poor 
and unemployed population is naturally dissatisfied. The major pool of insurgent 
recruits are young, unemployed, adult males. The primary motivation for a young male 
to join an insurgency is often the wage that it provides.”50 Thus, with this narrow focus 
the methods used are primarily focused on short term improvements. The two methods 
are an infusion of capital, again leveraging Big Push ideas, and “conduct[ing] stability 
operations to create situations where businesses can thrive.”51  
Billions of dollars have been spent on the Commander’s Emergency Response 
Program (CERP). This program gives low-level commanders significant funds to jump 
start the communities in which they operate. This program has been very successful 
from the point of view of these commanders. However, these successes have only been 
enduring when they strengthen indigent elements of commitment regimes. 
Military doctrine does acknowledge its short-term focus and notes “this initial 
economic infusion must be translated into consistent capital availability and sustainable 
jobs programs,”52 but offers little advice on how to achieve these effects. Commanders 
attempt to increase the effect of their investment funds through targeting meetings. 
They chase projects while struggling to implement Hirschman’s Unbalanced Growth 
model on the fly; but, without the assistance of industrial organization economists or 
Leontief’s comprehensive input/output tables.   
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Injecting an economy with capital development projects while calling for 
sustainability will not create an environment conducive to long-term economic growth. 
Security is essential for economic growth, but greater effort needs to be placed on 







COMMITMENT REGIMES AND IRAQ 
Many of the successes, failures, and conundrums in Iraq can be clarified using a 
commitment regime model. I will focus on four areas: ideas of investment led growth, 
the success of the Sons of Iraq, the failure to pass an oil law, and the neglect of Iraqi 
business law. 
Investment led growth practices led to a problem with reconstruction efforts in 
Iraq. The demand for new projects overwhelmed the economy’s ability to produce, and 
retain, skilled labor. Finding competent contractors was a large problem. Rather than 
this demand for labor leading to an increase in the supply of workers and the production 
of vital infrastructure, it led to a rapid drop in work quality which led to the long term 
failure of many projects.  
In an economy with better commitment regimes this would be a temporary 
quality slump. On the job training would improve job quality and eliminate new workers 
who could not improve. However, without the institutions and organizations that 
enforce contracts this is not necessarily the case. Fraud became a large problem. 
Contractors bid on work they were unable to complete, yet the entities letting these 
contracts were unable to effectively monitor and enforce contracted standards. Many 
projects became entangled with layers of subcontractors. Primary companies would bid 
and win contracts, then hire another company to perform on the contract. Without 




more profitable to not fulfill contracts. Lack of enforcement enabled a downward spiral.  
Even organizations attempting to enforce contracts by not hiring firms that failed 
to perform faced serious hurdles. First, with the high demand for skilled labor, 
organizations which failed to perform and were caught could simply reorganize and 
change their name and get new work. Second, and more problematically, many 
organizations lacked the ability to monitor the work they contracted due to the number 
of contracts and the restrictions on their movements due to security problems.  
Violence was not only a political tool, but an economic one. Competent oversight 
of construction was eliminated when travel became restricted. This creates an 
environment where governance is not only contested by political insurgents, but also by 
economic agents focused on profits. The weakening of commitment regimes spread the 
roots of insurgency to economic actors. Blasting investments into an economy may have 
created short-term growth but it definitely created rewards for violence, incompetence 
and corruption.  
The Sons of Iraq, and the tribal Awakening movement, was a successful program 
for increasing security in Sunni neighborhoods throughout the former Triangle of Death. 
Though not an explicit embrace of commitment regimes, it is apparent that the base 
idea played a role in the success of the program. Success was achieved through US 
commander support for organizations which leveraged tribal institutions and beliefs. 
The Sons of Iraq program was an initiative of the US military which began small 
and soon became the primary approach towards Sunni areas. The Sons of Iraq were 




these groups, individuals used their own weapons, or no weapons at all, to perform 
their duties. CERP funded these contracts, which were let to tribal, or sometimes 
neighborhood, leaders. Once a contract was assigned for an area to a local leader, these 
leaders used personal connections to fill slots. This built up their wasta, an Arabic term 
for honor and influence, because it created indebtedness for income to this local leader. 
Increased wasta gave these leaders the needed leverage to mediate neighborhood 
conflicts. This helped to break the ties which connected many young men to insurgent 
paymasters. 
These structures were better able to stand against foreign mujahedeen groups 
organized around a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam than intermittent Iraqi and 
US military patrols. Many locals had become embittered against foreign fighters. These 
mujahedeen had been harassing Iraqis for “smoking cigarettes and even for drinking 
water…. They had banned alcohol, Western films, makeup, hairdressers… and even 
playing dominoes in the coffeehouses.”53 
Supporting oppositional commitment regimes helped the Government of Iraq 
and the Coalition defeat the violent extremists present among the populace of Iraq. 
These tribal regimes were not against Islam, or even against government. They were 
concerned with preserving their dignity and building a future for their communities. 
Progress on a national oil law is still stalled in the Council of Representatives, 
years after US Ambassador Khalilizad declared a breakthrough as he exited Iraq in 2006. 
This law has consistently been highlighted locally and internationally as essential to the 
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development of Iraq. The scope of the law is creating a national oil company and a 
system to distribute profits from the enormous mineral assets to be found beneath Iraq.  
 Issues remain on what percentage of oil profits will go to which provinces, how 
this percentage will be decided in the future, how money will flow from the oil to 
provinces, what are the roles of regions, groups of provinces, in the process of oil 
project development, etc.  
The Iraqi Council of Representatives has difficulty passing a law because there is 
no authority which is able to credibly adjudicate and balance the concerns of all parties; 
nor will there be until the governmental commitment regime becomes more stable, and 
less partisan. Rather than focusing on stabilization of underlying commitment regimes, 
years of attempts have been made to come to an agreement with extant power 
balances. Who would be the guarantor? There is no outside party with credible 
enforcement power. 
So much effort has been spent on developing a national oil law, while something 
much more essential has been glossed over, nearly ignored. Iraqi business law is in a 
state of disrepair. Doingbusiness.org, an international research group under the 
auspices of the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation, has consistently 
ranked Iraq at the bottom end of international rankings for ease of doing business. Iraq 
ranked 166 out of 183 in both 2010 and 2011 reports.54 Many Iraqi business laws date 
from the monarchy, or the days of the national socialist Ba’ath party, without 
modification.  
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One stubborn problem is the difficulty and cost of importing and exporting 
goods. The Doing Business survey ranked Iraq at 180 of 183 in 2010, improving one 
position in 2011. They estimate in 2011 that clearing customs took 80 days and cost 
$3550 USD per container of goods. The bulk of these difficulties are legislative rules in 
nature, though corruption certainly plays a part in this process in many cases. The US 
military, in cooperation with other US agencies, assembled a number of Point of Entry 
Training Teams (POETT). These officers struggled daily with accelerating the process of 
importing and exporting goods and streamlining border control points. They faced 
numerous obstacles. No Iraqi agency was accorded authority over the entire process or 
operations at a POE and so every change became an intra-ministerial boondoggle 
requiring authorization from Baghdad. This authorization usually ended up bogged 
down in coordination between ministers, who may be political opponents due to the 
power sharing character of Iraqi governments. 
In 2011 Iraq ranked 141st in contract enforcement. This enforcement would take 
an estimated 520 days and cost 28.1% of the claim.55 In addition, this enforcement is 
primarily available for legitimate registered businesses, while starting a business in Iraq 
requires 11 steps, involving around 77 days, and the cost to do so is more than the 
average Iraqi made in a year. In contrast I registered a consulting business in Utah online 
in two days for around $100 USD. Many international nongovernmental organizations 
have had trouble registering as a business in Iraq in order to legitimately conduct 
reconstruction programs benefiting the Iraqi people. 






Yet, very little high level work has been done in Iraq to streamline these business 
processes. Instead, most Iraqi legislative, and US Embassy energy was focused instead 
on negotiations regarding oil. One body was established to spur international 
investment in Iraq, the Iraqi National Investment Commission (NIC).56 However, this 
group has turned primarily into a promotional body. For instance, in 2009 they 
sponsored a business fair in Washington DC to showcase business opportunities in 
Iraq.57 The NIC had no powers to offer incentives for international companies to bring 
investment to Iraq. The most they can do is attempt to help companies wend their way 
through bureaucratic hurdles. 
Development needs to focus more on building institutions, creating efficient 
rules, and then empowering organizations to disseminate and enforce them. Private 
markets are a disorganized hodgepodge in Iraq, many Iraqis do not understand how 
private markets function and have limited access to the tools to create success. Colonel 
Peter Mansoor remarked: “I did my best to tutor the advisory councils on the laws of 
supply and demand, fixed price controls, and the black market, but to little avail… The 
Iraqis looked at me like I was crazy. They had adjusted their mindset to price-controlled 
LPG [liquefied petroleum gas] at 250 Dinars per bottle, and no one could convince them 
of the folly of the economics at that price.”58 
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The developed world is not characterized by the absence of violence. Rather it 
embodies better organized violence, which minimizes violence at the individual and 
charismatic levels. Commitment regimes are the best way to envision productive 
structures of violence. If we want to increase the options and investment in a society we 
need to explicitly work with these regimes; fighting some, supporting others. As 
Lieutenant General Jacoby, commander I Corps, Multinational Corps – Iraq, once said to 
us: “the longer I look at this [the war in Iraq], the more it looks like a rule of law 
problem.”59 Establishing structures of rules and enforcement in accordance with local 
belief structures is the key to building security and stability.  
Development planning, and practice, needs to better take into account the role 
of violence. Specifically, indigenous structures which harness violence need to be 
investigated and improved, or attacked. The continued focus of the development 
community on outdated ideas of kick starting development through investment shocks 
is nonproductive. A change in focus toward structures of commitment and violence is 
necessary for effective development. 
 Development at the strategic level requires a holistic practice. Specialization at 
the strategic level is not likely to lead to better results. Specialized individuals often 
attempt to apply the solutions found in their particular area of expertise. Without a 
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comprehensive idea of process this amalgamation leads to Frankensteinian policy, a 
simulacrum of a solution, but one which often brings out fire and pitchforks among the 
local populace. Political scientists are quick to implement democratic solutions while 
economists implement free market reforms. Little do they understand that rapid 
simultaneous implementation of these two paths often leads to chaos, and thence 
welcomed tyranny, rather than the freedoms to which they aspire. 
As our national security has become more dependent on security in foreign lands 
this becomes a more important problem. In the face of tighter budgets, development 
practitioners need to adopt a new methodology. Too often investment led projects have 
brought scandal, and the response often is that these are the bad apples, not 
representative of general practice, but repetition makes one wonder. Commitment 
regimes give a new focus for practice. One which can unite disparate development 
communities—military, diplomatic and nonprofit—in a way investment led growth has 
not. 
External infusion of capital based on political decision making creates subsidized 
opportunity. This should not be mistaken for intrinsic growth. Once the subsidies end, 
the opportunities will end. The role of development should be to create the 
preconditions for success which are based in the institutions, organizations and beliefs 
of indigent structures. Development practice which focuses on creating viable indigent 
commitment regimes will create a more efficient and efficacious system and will make 
each exchange more profitable. Doing so will open the floodgates to international 




opportunities to invest trillions of dollars, more than any national development agency 
could ever command. 
Commitment regimes and concomitant security are an input in a production 
function as essential as capital and labor. Without credible commitment, and security, 
production is limited by fraud, extortion and expropriation. Development must embrace 
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